Dr. Tingjun LIU received his Ph.D. in Financial Economics from Carnegie Mellon University in 2007.  He also holds a B.S. in Physics from Peking University, and a Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Virginia.  Tingjun joined The University of Hong Kong as Associate Professor in 2016.  Before joining HKU, Tingjun taught at W.P. Carey School of Business at Arizona State University, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, and Hanqing Advanced Institute of Economics and Finance at Renmin University of China.

Tingjun’s research interests include theoretical corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions, and auction theory.  He has published papers in leading academic journals including Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Review, and Management Science.  His research on corporate finance identifies a novel interaction between firms’ competition process and the steps they take to reduce the cash flow variability.  His work on mergers and acquisitions shows that if an acquiring firm does not have enough cash to pay for the acquisition -- and hence needs to obtain financing after winning, the acquirer will offer a premium to the target firm. Such a premium signals a high quality of the acquirer and facilitates the post-acquisition financing, the benefit of which outweighs the cost of a higher acquisition price.  His research on auction theory focuses on security-bid auctions -- auctions in which bidders offer securities whose values depend not only on the face value of the bid but also on the private information of the bidder.  Currently he works on projects that further explore firms’ strategic behaviors.

Areas of Interest
  • Theoretical Corporate Finance
  • Mergers and Acquisitions
  • Auction Theory
  • Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon University
  • Ph.D., University of Virginia
  • B.S., Peking University
Selected Publications
  • “Targeting Target Shareholders,”
    (with Dan Bernhardt and Robert Marquez), Management Science, 2017, forthcoming.
  • “Endogenous Entry to Security-bid Auctions,”
    (with Takeharu Sogo and Dan Bernhardt), American Economic Review, 2016, 106(11): pp. 3577-89.
  • “Optimal Equity Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders,”
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, Volume 166, pp. 94-123.
  •  “Takeover Bidding with Signaling Incentives”,
    Review of Financial Studies, 2012, Volume 2, pp. 522-556.
  • “Hedging and Competition,”
    (with Christine Parlour), Journal of Financial Economics, 2009, Volume 94, pp. 492-507.